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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 3, 2009, a man in Binghamton, New York walked into an 
immigration services center during a class with two pistols.1 At 10:30 a.m., he 
began firing.2 By the time he was finished, he had killed thirteen people and 
critically injured four before turning the gun on himself.3 The Binghamton 
shooter was licensed by the State of New York to carry concealed firearms.4 He 
bought two guns, loaded them, and drove to the center; and until he pulled the 
trigger, he had not committed a crime.5 
There have been more than 150 mass shootings in America since 1966, 
resulting in more than 1,000 deaths.6 Of the 305 firearms used in these 
shootings, at least 175 of them were obtained legally.7 Since 2013, there have 
been 386 school shootings, an average of about one per week.8 A small number 
of these mass shootings have been perpetrated by people with concealed carry 
licenses.9  
                                                                                                                     
 1 Robert D. McFadden, 13 Shot Dead During a Class on Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
3, 2009), https://nyti.ms/2CdBqar [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Manny Fernandez & Nate Schweber, Binghamton Killer Kept His Fury Private, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2009), https://nyti.ms/2FWIHdG [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].  
 5 McFadden, supra note 1. 
 6 Bonnie Berkowitz et al., The Terrible Numbers that Grow With Each Mass Shooting, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/ 
mass-shootings-in-america/?utm_term=.a90188269a48 [https://perma.cc/W556-L7ZJ] (last 
updated Nov. 9, 2018) (defining “mass shooting” as shootings in which four or more people 
were killed by one or two shooters); see also Lenyon Whitaker, MAP: Timeline of Mass 
Shootings in the US Since 2000, METRO (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.metro.us/news/map-
timeline-of-mass-shootings-in-the-us-since-2000/tmWmll---14WH11UWCww 
[https://perma.cc/9CN6-VBLT] (last updated Nov. 8, 2018) (highlighting certain mass  
shootings since the turn of the century).  
 7 Berkowitz et al., supra note 6. 
 8 Gunfire on School Grounds in the United States, EVERYTOWN (May 25, 2018), 
https://everytownresearch.org/gunfire-in-school/ [https://perma.cc/W47J-XCEH] (last  
updated Jan. 7, 2019) (defining school shooting as any time a firearm discharges a live round 
inside a school building or on a school campus or grounds, as documented by the press and, 
when necessary, confirmed through further inquiries with law enforcement or school 
officials).  
 9 See Mass Shootings Committed by Concealed Carry Killers, VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., 
http://concealedcarrykillers.org/mass-shootings-committed-by-concealed-carry-killers/ 
[https://perma.cc/6W9Y-H4TY] (last updated Oct. 29, 2018) (listing shootings with more 
than three casualties committed by concealed carry permit holders since May 2007). But see 
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For years, politicians, scholars, and members of the press have sought to 
introduce new and innovative ways to regulate firearms.10 Several states have 
tried to curb gun violence through “good cause statutes.”11 These statutes 
require people seeking concealed carry permits to provide a good cause for 
carrying a weapon in public.12 Good cause statutes vary in how restrictively they 
define “good cause” and in how they interact with the broader regulation of 
firearms of the state.13 
These efforts to reduce gun violence necessarily make gun ownership 
among law-abiding citizens more difficult, which in turn implicates 
considerations of personal liberty guaranteed by the Second Amendment.14 In 
                                                                                                                     
Concealed Carry Permit Holders Crime Statistics, GUNS TO CARRY, 
https://www.gunstocarry.com/concealed-carry-statistics/concealed-carry-permit-holders-
crime-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/7WBB-JCQS] (suggesting less than one tenth of one 
percent of crimes are committed by concealed carry permit holders); Brief for Arizona et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Gould v. O’Leary, 907 F.3d 659 (1st 
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2202) (outlining firearm crime statistics in Minnesota, Ohio, Louisiana, 
Florida, and Texas). 
 10 See generally Jeremy Diamond & Dan Merica, Trump Repeatedly Upends GOP 
Lawmakers in Gun Session, CNN (Feb. 28, 2018), http://cnn.it/2oD4dfk 
[https://perma.cc/XRQ8-5Q7Q] (detailing President Trump’s remarks on gun control 
legislation); Tara Golshan & Ella Nilsen, Where the Gun Control Debate Stands in Congress, 
VOX (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/27/17053968/gun-control-debate-
congress-parkland [https://perma.cc/CNS4-N54R] (outlining Congressional responses to the 
school shooting in Parkland, Florida); Daniella Diaz, 5 Things Congress Could Do on Guns, 
CNN (Feb. 26, 2018), http://cnn.it/2ESVXTH [https://perma.cc/L9UD-VH7F] (evaluating 
the likelihood of gun control legislation passing); Opinion, Nicholas Kristof, How to Reduce 
Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hL5i2c [on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal] (last updated Nov. 8, 2018) (outlining possible solutions suggested by scholars); 
Rebecca Kaplan & Rebecca Shabad, Five Ways the U.S. Could Reduce Gun Violence, CBS 
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/five-ways-the-us-could-reduce-gun-
violence/ [https://perma.cc/9TS3-BKMX] (same); see also ‘No Way to Prevent This,’ Says 
Only Nation Where This Regularly Happens, THE ONION (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.the 
onion.com/no-way-to-prevent-this-says-only-nation-where-this-r-1830308976 
[https://perma.cc/2DQ8-M64B]. The Onion has published the same article after every mass 
shooting since 2015, using satire to “capture the frustration and futility felt by so many 
people.” Eli Rosenberg, This Onion Story Goes Viral After Every Mass Shooting, CHI. TRIB. 
(Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-onion-story-goes-viral 
-after-every-mass-shooting-20171004-story.html [https://perma.cc/FF2C-T2J7].  
 11 See Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 127 
HARV. L. REV. F. 218, 218–19 (2014) (explaining the good cause requirement and listing 
California, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland as examples). The precise terminology for 
these types of statutes varies greatly, with different jurisdictions using different terms like 
“urgency or need,” “exceptional cases,” “good and substantial reason,” “good reason,” 
“justifiable need,” “proper cause,” and “proper reason.” See, e.g., infra Part III. This Note 
couches all of these phrases under the umbrella term “good cause statutes.” 
 12 Blocher, supra note 11, at 218. 
 13 See infra Part III. 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).  
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2008, the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second 
Amendment provides a right of the people to own a handgun for self-defense in 
the home.15 In Heller, the Court determined that self-defense is a “core lawful 
purpose”16 of gun ownership, and concluded that personal gun ownership is a 
core right under the Second Amendment.17 Heller stands for the proposition that 
the Constitution provides a floor for the individual right to bear arms, and that 
floor cannot be lowered by one judge’s discretion.18 But the Heller majority also 
conceded that there are limits to the protections afforded by the Second 
Amendment.19 The Court included a non-exhaustive list of constitutionally 
valid, historical restrictions on gun ownership, critically including historic 
prohibitions on carrying concealed firearms.20  
There are still interpretation problems with the scope of the Heller 
decision.21 Does the core lawful purpose of self-defense extend to public use?22 
How should courts determine whether a Second Amendment right is a core 
right? And how should the Court interpret the constitutionality of a restriction 
on guns that does not infringe on a core right?23 Good cause statutes are a useful 
window into the exploration of the questions left unanswered by Heller. The 
Court in Heller did not address whether the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
core rights include the right to carry concealed weapons in public.24 It did not 
address whether concealed carry permit regulations implicate the Second 
                                                                                                                     
 15 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). The Court incorporated 
this right against the States two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 
(2010). 
 16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 17 Id. at 595. 
 18 Id. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core 
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach. The very 
enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government . . . the power to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional 
guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional 
guarantee at all.”). 
 19 Id. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited.”). 
 20 Id. The Court also noted historical restrictions on firearm bans for felons or mentally 
ill, prohibiting possession on school grounds or government buildings, and imposing 
restrictions and qualifications on the commercial sale of firearms. Id. at 626–27. 
 21 For a master list of the circuits’ interpretations of Heller and an in-depth discussion 
of special Second Amendment topics, see David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The 
Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193 (2017). 
 22 See id. at 256–74; Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside 
the Home, Take Two: How We Got Here and Why It Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 374 
n.3 (2016) (listing legal commentary addressing public right to carry firearms). 
 23 See generally Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 21, at 274–313 (unpacking the different 
modes of analysis used in Heller and subsequent cases); Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s 
Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012) 
(same). 
 24 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
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Amendment.25 And it did not address what mode of analysis a court should use 
to answer these questions and determine whether good cause statutes can be 
constitutional.26 
Courts and scholars alike have struggled to discern how to correctly apply 
Heller to Second Amendment issues, including good cause statutes. Good cause 
statutes have generated a new split in the circuit courts27 and a wide swath of 
academic literature.28 One recent addition to this dialogue in federal circuit 
courts comes from a decision coming out of the D.C. Circuit, Wrenn v. District 
of Columbia.29 The court in Wrenn held that there is a core constitutional right 
to carry weapons in public, and D.C.’s good cause statute unconstitutionally 
infringed on that right.30 The analysis in Wrenn, as well as its conclusion, is at 
odds with several other circuits,31 making the question ripe for the Supreme 
Court to address. 
In Part II, this Note unpacks the Heller decision and the modes of analysis 
it generated in the circuit courts, including the two-step analysis used now by 
nearly every circuit.32 Part III introduces and explains the four different 
categories of good cause statutes and locates each of them within the current 
Second Amendment jurisprudence among various circuits, highlighting a split 
caused by a recent decision in the D.C. Circuit. In Part IV, this Note argues that 
the Supreme Court should adopt the two-step method used by most circuits, and 
add a preliminary “step zero” to that method. Part V analyzes each of the 
categories of good cause statutes under the proposed analytical regime. It 
explains that the most restrictive statutes within the most restrictive regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
 25 See James Bishop, Note, Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to Carry After Heller, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 909 (2012). 
 26 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35; see also Rostron, supra note 23, at 705. 
 27 Compare Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(striking down D.C.’s good cause statute as unconstitutional), with Gould v. Morgan, 907 
F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018) (upholding Massachusetts’s good cause statute), Peruta v. Cty. of 
San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (same in California), cert. denied 
sub nom. Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017), Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 
882 (4th Cir. 2013) (same in Maryland), Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(same in New Jersey), and Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(same in New York). 
 28 See Bishop, supra note 25; Lindsay Colvin, Note, History, Heller, and High-Capacity 
Magazines: What Is the Proper Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041 (2014); Nicholas Griepsma, Note, Conceal Carry Through 
Common Use: Extending Heller’s Constitutional Construction, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 284 
(2017); Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 21; Nicholas Moeller, Comment, The Second 
Amendment Beyond the Doorstep: Concealed Carry Post-Heller, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1401 
(2014); Rostron, supra note 23. 
 29 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 30 Id. at 666–67; see also infra Part III. 
 31 See supra note 27. 
 32 Borrowing from administrative law doctrine introduced in Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), this Note colloquially refers to the circuits’ Second 
Amendment test as the Marzzarella two-step. 
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schemes will always run afoul of the Second Amendment, but that all other good 
cause statutes are constitutional unless they cannot pass intermediate scrutiny. 
Part VI concludes by placing the suggested framework back in the context of 
the Court’s broader Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
II. THE HELLER DECISION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARZZARELLA 
TWO-STEP 
In 2003, Dick Anthony Heller tried to get a gun in the District of 
Columbia.33 Mr. Heller was a special police officer who regularly carried his 
firearm with him while working, and he wanted to carry a personal firearm 
within his home.34 The District’s statutory scheme regulating firearms, 
however, prohibited personal ownership of guns.35 So Mr. Heller sued the 
District of Columbia under the Second Amendment, claiming a constitutional 
right to bear arms within his home.36 The Supreme Court held that there is an 
individual right to gun ownership under the Second Amendment, and that the 
District’s firearm ban unconstitutionally restricted that right.37 
Heller is a fascinating opinion. Apart from its critical implications for 
Second Amendment jurisprudence, the case also produced two titanic debates 
between the Justices that continue to be relitigated even ten years later.38 The 
first is the competing analyses of the purpose of the Second Amendment 
between Justices Scalia and Stevens.39 Heller is perhaps the peak of the twenty-
six years of battle between the two Justices, and the tit-for-tat between the 
majority and the principal dissent ranges from diverse constructions of the 
history of gun ownership in the United States40 to careful analyses of the Court’s 
                                                                                                                     
 33 Complaint at 3, Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(No. 03-cv-213). 
 34 Id. at 2–3; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008). 
 35 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75 (“The District of Columbia generally prohibits the 
possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of 
handguns is prohibited.”). 
 36 Id. at 575–76. 
 37 Id. at 628–30. 
 38 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, ‘It’s a Long Story’: Justice John Paul Stevens, 98, Is 
Publishing a Memoir, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/ 
us/politics/john-paul-stevens-memoir.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (calling 
Heller “just about as bad [a decision] as any in my tenure”); Tony Mauro, Stevens Recounts 
His Clashes with Scalia, NAT. L.J. (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal 
/almID/1202755971832/ [https://perma.cc/W9M2-44WW] (“Stevens has criticized Scalia’s 
position in Heller in more than two dozen speeches since retiring.”). 
 39 Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573–636 (2008), with id. at 
636–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 40 Compare id. at 619–26, with id. at 672–79. 
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previous Second Amendment jurisprudence to the semantic and grammatical 
construction of the Amendment itself.41  
Justices Scalia and Breyer account for the second debate, which centers 
around the future of Second Amendment questions to be governed by Heller.42 
Although not nearly as iconic as the first, it is, perhaps, more pragmatic.43 This 
section provides an in-depth overview of that second debate—how to analyze 
Second Amendment questions after Heller. Where Justice Breyer’s dissent 
advocates for an interest-balancing test,44 Justice Scalia’s majority describes a 
categorical analysis.45 This section then describes the two-step test developed 
and adopted by nearly every lower court in the years following Heller. 
A. Justice Breyer’s Interest-Balancing Test 
Justice Breyer adopted Justice Steven’s dissent in its entirety.46 His separate 
dissenting opinion assumes arguendo that individual self-defense is one of the 
purposes of the Second Amendment as envisioned by the Framers.47 In his 
opinion, Justice Breyer addresses how to approach Second Amendment 
questions under the assumption that it does contain an individual liberty to bear 
arms in self-defense.48 First, the dissent considers applying traditional levels of 
scrutiny to Second Amendment questions, but ultimately discards them in favor 
of a shifting interest-balancing test.49 It then applies this interest-balancing test 
to the facts in Heller and concludes that the handgun ban at issue passes the 
proposed constitutional test.50 
Justice Breyer’s dissent begins by examining historical evidence to 
determine if the Second Amendment’s self-defense liberty interest can justify 
invalidating any gun regulation statute.51 After concluding that the self-defense 
interest is not sufficient by itself to conclude an analysis of a Second 
Amendment question,52 the opinion considers the application of traditional 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Compare id. at 577–92 (majority opinion), with id. at 640–52 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). The semantic debate makes more sense in light of the punishingly complex 
language of the Second Amendment: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 42 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35; id. at 681–91, 721–22 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 43 See Rostron, supra note 23, at 706–07. 
 44 Heller, 554 U.S. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 45 Id. at 626–29, 634–35 (majority opinion). 
 46 Id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. at 682–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 48 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 49 Id. at 687–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 50 Heller, 554 U.S. at 706–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 51 Id. at 683–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 52 Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[H]istorical evidence demonstrates that a self-
defense assumption is the beginning, rather than the end, of any constitutional inquiry.”). 
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means-end scrutiny.53 The respondent in Heller advocated for the application of 
strict scrutiny to all Second Amendment questions,54 but Justice Breyer rejected 
that position, pointing to the majority’s admission that certain categories of gun 
regulation are constitutional,55 and these categories would likely be 
unconstitutional under a pure strict scrutiny analysis.56 
Instead, Justice Breyer explicitly proposed an interest-balancing test for 
Second Amendment questions to determine if the proposed regulation 
disproportionately burdens a liberty right within the Second Amendment in its 
attempt to promote a compelling government interest.57 Indeed, he argued that 
such a balancing test is the logical conclusion of applying strict scrutiny to any 
Second Amendment question.58 Under such a test, “the Court generally asks 
whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is 
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important 
governmental interests.”59 
To answer this question, Justice Breyer argued for deference to the 
legislature.60 In doing so, he drew an analogy to First Amendment cases,61 
reasoning that “deference to legislative judgment seems particularly appropriate 
here, where the judgment has been made by a local legislature, with particular 
knowledge of local problems and insight into appropriate local solutions.”62 
According to Justice Breyer, then, a Second Amendment question can thus be 
phrased: Does a legislature have substantial evidence to make a reasonable 
inference that a gun regulation fits the compelling interest of public safety?63 
Applying his test to the District’s statute, the thrust of Justice Breyer’s 
answer is yes.64 The District’s handgun ban should be constitutional because the 
                                                                                                                     
 53 Id. at 687–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 54 Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 55 Id. at 626–28 (majority opinion). 
 56 Heller, 554 U.S. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 57 Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 58 Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]lmost every gun-control regulation will seek 
to advance . . . a ‘primary concern . . . for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.’ The 
Court has deemed that interest . . . to be compelling, and the Court has . . . found such public-
safety concerns sufficiently forceful to justify restrictions on individual liberties. Thus, any 
attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an 
interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one 
side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 59 Id. at 689–91, 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60 Id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 61 Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)). “In reviewing 
the constitutionality of a statute, ‘courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments of Congress.’ Our sole obligation is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments, 
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’” Turner Broad. 
Sys., 520 U.S. at 195 (citations omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 
666 (1994)). 
 62 Heller, 554 U.S. at 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 63 See id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 64 Id. at 722 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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government’s interest in saving lives does not disproportionately burden an 
individual right of self-defense.65 The District’s safety interest passed this 
proportionality test because the legislature had substantial evidence to 
reasonably determine the necessity of the District-wide ban.66 
B. The Majority’s Categorical Test 
The majority in Heller expressly rejected Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing 
approach.67 The majority opinion does not take nearly as much time addressing 
Justice Breyer’s analytical dissent as it does on Justice Steven’s historical and 
semantic opinion.68 Instead, it discards the interest-balancing test as “judge-
empowering.”69 The Court held firm that the core protections of the Second 
Amendment must be beyond the reach of a judge’s discretion.70 Justice Scalia’s 
opinion also draws on the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence:  
Like the First, [the Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest 
balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them 
anew. And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above 
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.71 
Although not explicit, the majority’s response to Justice Breyer’s dissent 
suggests that when the core right of the Second Amendment is at issue, there is 
no other interest that can possibly justify infringement of that right.72 
                                                                                                                     
 65 Id. at 722–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 693–705 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 634–35 (majority opinion). 
 68 Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 631–36 (addressing Justice Breyer’s dissent), with id. 
at 586–92, 603–05, 620–25 (addressing Justice Stevens’ dissent). 
 69 Id. at 634. 
 70 Id. (“The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even 
the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the 
right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ 
assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”). 
 71 Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
 72 See id. at 630 (“[The law] makes it impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the 
core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)); id. at 
634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subject to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.” (emphasis added)); cf id. at 720 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What is its basis for finding that to be the core of the Second 
Amendment right?” (emphasis added)); see also Rostron, supra note 23,28 at 720 (“In 
Scalia’s view, laws infringing the core right established by the Second Amendment cannot 
be tolerated even if every legislator and judge in the country wholeheartedly agrees that such 
laws would have significant positive social effects.”); Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 21, at 
198 (outlining the Court’s holdings that self-defense is an “inherent” right, and that core 
rights are not subject to an interest-balancing test); cf. Colvin, supra note 28, at 1062 
(“[Heller] explicitly prohibited the use of balancing tests like strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
Rather, Heller mandated the examination of ‘text, history, and tradition’ to both determine 
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But the Court tempered this bright-line rule with a non-exhaustive list of 
clear exceptions to the rights contained within the Second Amendment.73 The 
Court admitted that a historical analysis of gun ownership in America reveals 
“that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any 
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”74 Rather, the categorical 
protection offered by the majority in Heller is limited to the core rights that fall 
within the Second Amendment.75 At this point, the Court has only established 
“lawful self-defense within the home” as a core right of the Second Amendment, 
but there is nothing in the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence to suggest 
that there are no other categorical rights.76 
Outside the categorical protection of the core right announced in Heller lie 
two categories of regulations: (1) longstanding historical regulations that are 
presumptively lawful77 and (2) other regulations that burden an individual’s 
ability to own and operate a firearm, but that do not infringe on a core right.78 
The Court indicated that the first category of regulations is entirely untouched 
by the Heller decision,79 and that the examples listed in the Court’s opinion are 
not exhaustive.80 But the Court in Heller ignored the second category of 
regulations altogether. Indeed, the Heller majority implicitly left the door open 
for lower courts to build on the full scope of the Second Amendment’s 
protections, refusing to “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the 
full scope of the Second Amendment.”81 
                                                                                                                     
the scope of Second Amendment rights and assess gun legislation.” (quoting Heller v. 
District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting))); 
Griepsma, supra note 28, at 300 (“Even under strict scrutiny, certain governmental interests 
can be so compelling as to justify the curtailment of a constitutional right. It is this broader 
notion that the [Heller] majority rejects . . . .”). 
 73 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 74 Id. at 626. 
 75 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 76 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 21, at 211–12 (noting that other Amendments have 
more than one core right, and arguing that “defense of others” and “militia uses” are also 
core rights of the Second Amendment). 
 77 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26. 
 78 See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). In dicta, the Court 
in Heller seems to limit the application of its categorical test to extreme regulations like 
outright bans. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“Few laws in the history of our Nation have come 
close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”). 
 79 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
 80 Id. at 627 n.26. 
 81 Id. at 626. 
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C. The Lower Courts – The Marzzarella Two-Step 
Although the Majority in Heller rejected Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing 
test, the approach lower courts have taken to most Second Amendment 
questions resembles it closely.82 Indeed, every single circuit has adopted some 
sort of means-end scrutiny that involves balancing the government’s interest in 
safety with the burden of regulations on individuals’ Second Amendment 
rights.83 In most courts, however, the actual means-end scrutiny analysis only 
comes into play when the regulation in question burdens a Second Amendment 
right outside of its core purpose.84 When a regulation amounts to an outright 
ban, Heller’s categorical test strikes it down.85 
The seminal case in the lower courts comes from the Third Circuit—United 
States v. Marzzarella86—which introduced a two-step analysis for courts to 
determine Second Amendment questions. In Marzzarella, the defendant was 
convicted of possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number.87 The 
defendant challenged his conviction under the Second Amendment.88 The Third 
Circuit considered how to approach the constitutionality of the statute under the 
Second Amendment.89 The government argued that the court should apply 
rational basis,90 while the defendant advocated for strict scrutiny.91 The Third 
Circuit summarily rejected the government’s rational basis argument, noting 
that Heller specifically forbade its use.92 But the defendant could not convince 
the court that strict scrutiny should always apply.93 Instead, the Third Circuit 
adopted a more flexible two-part test to decide Second Amendment questions: 
First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it does not, our 
inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-
                                                                                                                     
 82 See generally Rostron, supra note 23 (arguing that Justice Breyer’s framework has 
won out in the lower courts). 
 83 See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95–99 (3d Cir. 2010) (employing 
a two-step analysis to balance the government’s public safety interest against the burdens on 
the individual’s Second Amendment rights). Every other circuit has followed the Third 
Circuit’s test in some fashion. See infra notes 95–97. 
 84 See infra Part III.D. 
 85 See, e.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (invalidating a 
Massachusetts ban on stun guns). 
 86 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 87 Id. at 87 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(k)). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 95. 
 91 Id. at 96. 
 92 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95–96 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
629 n.27 (2008)). 
 93 Id. 
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end scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional. 
If it fails, it is invalid.94 
Although the application of the test has produced different rules among the 
circuits,95 the two-step Marzzarella framework itself has been fully adopted by 
every circuit except the Eighth.96 It has also been treated favorably in the Eighth 
Circuit.97 
One of the critical questions addressed by the circuits in applying the 
Marzzarella two-step test is what level of means-end scrutiny should apply. 
Virtually every circuit agrees that the rational basis test is inappropriate in any 
case that involves individual rights under the Second Amendment.98 Most 
circuits have also chosen to apply different forms of heightened scrutiny on a 
case-by-case basis.99 
The two-step analysis is a useful springboard for addressing new gun 
regulations, but it has not been adopted nor has it been approved by the Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 94 Id. at 89 (citation omitted). 
 95 Compare Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 690 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(en banc) (holding that prohibitions on felons and the mentally ill owning firearms are 
presumptively lawful because they satisfy heightened means-end scrutiny), with 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91–92 (holding that prohibitions on felons and the mentally ill 
owning firearms are presumptively lawful because they do not implicate Second Amendment 
rights at all). 
 96 See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668–69 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Chovan, 
735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarryOn.org, 
Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 846 
F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 97 See United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011) (describing the first 
step as a dispositive question in Second Amendment cases). 
 98 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96; accord Gould, 907 F.3d at 673; Chovan, 735 F.3d at 
1137; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195–96; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706; Heller v. District of 
Columbia, 670 F.3d at 1256; Reese, 627 F.3d at 801. But see Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 
21, at 251–52 (explaining the Second Circuit’s application of rational basis review to a 
statute that implicated the Second Amendment, but did not substantially burden the Second 
Amendment right in United States v. Descastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 99 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 21, at 275–78 (providing an overview of the flexible 
approaches used by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits); accord 
Tyler, 837 F.3d at 690–93 (analyzing the extent of the burden on the Second Amendment 
and determining that intermediate scrutiny should apply); see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 
96 (“Whether or not strict scrutiny may apply to particular Second Amendment challenges, 
it is not the case that it must be applied to all Second Amendment challenges.”).  
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Court.100 For now, though, the Marzzarella two-step framework governs the 
Second Amendment in nearly all federal courts. The next Part provides an 
overview of good cause statutes as they have been implemented in various states 
and Washington, D.C. and examines how different categories of good cause 
statutes have been interpreted differently across the circuits. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF GOOD CAUSE STATUTES 
At their heart, good cause statutes restrict who may successfully apply to 
receive a permit to a carry a firearm in public.101 When it comes to concealed 
carry permits, every jurisdiction in the United States falls into one of three broad 
categories: (1) unrestricted, (2) shall issue, or (3) may issue.102 In “may issue” 
jurisdictions, officials have the authority and discretion to grant or deny gun 
permits to applicants based on statutory requirements.103 A good cause statute 
is an example of such a requirement. It requires applicants to explain why they 
are applying (to provide good cause) to carry a firearm before they can receive 
a permit.104 Currently, eight states have some form of a good cause requirement 
that applicants must meet to qualify for a permit, whether open or concealed.105 
Each of these eight statutes can be neatly fit into one of four categories based 
on how restrictive the language of the statutory definition of good cause is, and 
how restrictive the state’s overall statutory scheme is for the regulation of 
carrying open firearms.106 These four categories house every good cause statute 
in this way: 
                                                                                                                     
 100 See Rostron, supra note 23, at 716–17 (speculating that the Court’s failure to adopt 
any specific Second Amendment test is due, in part, to Chief Justice Roberts’ skepticism 
toward applying means-end scrutiny to the Second Amendment at all). 
 101 See Blocher, supra note 11, at 218–19. 
 102 See generally Bishop, supra note 28, at 911–14 (describing shall-issue and may-issue 
jurisdictions); Nancy Thorne, What Is the Difference Between “May Issue”, “Shall Issue”, 
“No Issue” and “Unrestricted” Concealed Carry Laws?, NAT’L CARRY ACAD. (Aug. 29, 
2016), https://www.nationalcarryacademy.com/our-blog/mayissueshallissuenoissue/  
[https://perma.cc/G35R-9W8X] (providing a primer for the different types of concealed 
carry permit laws); GIFFORDS LAW CTR., Concealed Carry, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun 
-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/ [https://perma.cc/B556-4WD5]  
(outlining different concealed carry laws in every U.S. jurisdiction). 
 103 GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 102. 
 104 See Blocher, supra note 11, at 219 (arguing that an end to good cause statutes would 
make a jurisdiction effectively “shall issue”). 
 105 CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150(a)(2) (2018) (California); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1441(a)(2) (2015) (Delaware); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-9(a)-(c) (West 2008) 
(Hawaii); PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) (2015) (Maryland); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, 
§ 131(d) (LexisNexis 2016) (Massachusetts); MD. CODE ANN., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c) 
(West 2019) (New Jersey); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(n) (McKinney 2019) (New York); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-11(a) (2002) (Rhode Island); see also GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra 
note 102. 
 106 For these two variables, this Note refers to the definition of good cause as “definition” 
and the broader statutory scheme as “open carry.” 
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Table 1: Four Categories of “Good Case Statutes”  
 
 Permissive Open Carry Restrictive Open Carry 
Permissive 
Definition 
1 Massachusetts 2 New York, Rhode Island 
 
Restrictive 
Definition 
3 Delaware 4 California, Hawaii, 
Maryland, New Jersey, 
D.C.107 
 
The first category is the least restrictive on paper. It includes jurisdictions 
with an easy-to-meet definition of good cause, and non-restrictive open carry 
laws. The second category includes jurisdictions with easy-to-meet good cause 
requirements, but restrictive open carry laws, or outright bans. In other words, 
the second category focuses regulation on open carry, rather than concealed 
carry. The third category holds applicants to a higher standard to meet good 
cause but balances the greater restrictions with less restrictive open carry laws. 
That is, the third category restricts concealed carry rather than open carry. The 
fourth category is the most restrictive. It includes jurisdictions with tight good 
cause requirements and restrictive open carry laws. Together, these regulations 
often amount to a near-total ban of firearms. 
The Supreme Court has not spoken on the constitutionality of good cause 
statutes generally, and it has not considered any of these categories specifically. 
But several circuits have weighed in on the issue. The rest of this Part provides 
an overview of each category of good cause statutes, including each circuit-level 
decision. It discusses good cause statutes in the context of states’ open carry and 
concealed carry laws, measuring how restrictive each good cause requirement 
is when viewed in the light of the overall statutory scheme. 
A. The First Category: Permissive Definition and Permissive Open 
Carry  
Overall, Massachusetts has the most permissive language in its statute 
requiring good cause for concealed carry permit applicants. Massachusetts 
generally requires a permit to open carry a firearm in public.108 Once a person 
receives a permit, however, they may open carry their firearm freely.109 
Massachusetts also has different classifications of firearm permits: firearm 
                                                                                                                     
 107 But see Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667–68 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(invalidating D.C.’s good cause statute and creating a split in the circuits).  
 108 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269 § 10 (2015). 
 109 Id. (“No person having in effect a license to carry firearms for any purpose . . . shall 
be deemed to be in violation of this section.”). 
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identification cards, class B licenses to carry, and class A licenses to carry.110 
Firearm identification cards and class B licenses entitle a person to purchase, 
possess, and openly carry certain firearms and ammunition.111 Class A permits 
entitle a person to carry concealed firearms and ammunition.112 
Firearm identification cards are relatively easy to come by. The language of 
the Massachusetts statute is permissive,113 and the only requirements are that 
the applicant must be over eighteen years old (or have a parent’s permission), 
and not be a “prohibited person.”114 Although more restrictive than a state that 
allows open carry without a permit,115 the language of the statutory scheme in 
Massachusetts is much less onerous than jurisdictions like California or 
Hawaii.116 
Massachusetts’ statutory provision for Class A licenses houses the state’s 
good cause statute.117 But the good cause requirement in the statute also uses 
rather permissive language.118 In order to receive a class A permit, an applicant 
must show “good reason to fear injury” to property or person, or “any other 
reason including . . . sport or target practice.”119 Local police have the ultimate 
authority to decide whether an applicant has provided good cause in their 
application, and whether their license should be limited in any way.120 
The First Circuit produced the latest case revolving around good cause 
statutes in Gould v. Morgan.121 In Gould, the plaintiffs applied for licenses to 
carry firearms in Massachusetts, but had several limitations placed on the 
                                                                                                                     
 110 Id. ch. 140 §§ 129B, 131 (2018). 
 111 See MASS.GOV, Gun Ownership in Massachusetts, https://www.mass.gov/service-
details/gun-ownership-in-massachusetts [https://perma.cc/KS6N-DZYT]. Class B licenses 
to carry are no longer issued, but the last class B permits will not expire until 2021. An Act 
Relevant to the Reduction of Gun Violence, 2014 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 284 § 101 (West) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2021). 
 112 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 § 131 (2018). 
 113 Id. § 129B (“A firearm identification card shall be issued and possessed.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 114 MASS.GOV, supra note 111. “Prohibited persons” include, for example, violent 
criminals, the mentally ill, and children under the age of fourteen. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 
§ 129B (2018). 
 115 For example, Alaska does not require a permit to open carry at all. See GIFFORDS 
LAW CTR., Open Carrying in Alaska, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/open-carrying-in-alaska/ 
[https://perma.cc/2FPL-HM2B] (last updated Nov. 9, 2017).  
 116 See infra Part III.D. 
 117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 § 131(d) (2018). 
 118 But see Ruggiero v. Police Comm’r of Bos., 464 N.E.2d 104, 106–08 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1984) (holding that the legislature intended for police to have discretion to restrict 
licenses to carry to specific purposes based on the individual’s reason for application). 
 119 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 § 131(d) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 120 Id.; see also Ruggiero, 464 N.E.2d at 107 (upholding limitation imposed by police 
department on license to carry). 
 121 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018).  
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licenses they were issued.122 The plaintiffs sued the Brookline and Boston 
Police Departments under the Second Amendment, claiming that the limitations 
placed on their licenses to carry prevented them from exercising their right to 
defend themselves in public.123 The court disagreed, holding that the 
Massachusetts good cause statute does not violate the Second Amendment.124 
Critically, the court expressly rejected the plaintiffs’ proposition that public self-
defense is a core right under the Second Amendment.125 After limiting “the core 
Second Amendment right . . . to self-defense in the home,”126 the First Circuit 
applied intermediate scrutiny to Massachusetts’ good cause statute, concluding 
that the government’s interest in preventing gun violence led the law to pass its 
constitutional test.127 
B. The Second Category: Permissive Definition and Restrictive Open 
Carry  
The next category of good cause statutes includes jurisdictions with a 
permissive definition of what constitutes good cause, but a restrictive open carry 
policy. These jurisdictions include New York128 and Rhode Island.129 Both 
states prohibit open carry without a license,130 but the statutory language 
defining good cause is generally permissive.131 But New York and Rhode Island 
courts have interpreted “good cause” much more narrowly than the statutory 
language suggests. 
New York state courts interpret the broad language of the New York good 
cause statute to allow licensing authorities broad discretion.132 In O’Connor v. 
Scarpino, Michael O’Connor applied for a concealed carry permit for hunting, 
target shooting, and self-defense, but New York only issued him a license 
restricted to target shooting and hunting.133 O’Connor argued that the plain 
                                                                                                                     
 122 Id. at 662. The restrictions included limitations to activities like hunting and sporting, 
and restrictions to locations like the workplace or at home. Id. at 664. Critically, the 
plaintiffs’ licenses did not include the general right to self-defense outside the home. See id. 
 123 Id. at 667 (“[Plaintiffs] contend that the right to carry firearms in public for self-
defense lies at the core of the Second Amendment and, thus, admits of no regulation.”). 
 124 Id. at 672. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Gould, 907 F.3d at 672. 
 128 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2018). 
 129 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-11(a) (2002). 
 130 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03(3) (McKinney 2018); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8(a) 
(2002). 
 131 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-11 (2002) (defining good cause as “good reason to fear 
an injury to his or her person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol 
or revolver”); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (defining 
“proper cause” to include target practice, hunting, or self-defense). 
 132 O’Connor v. Scarpino, 638 N.E.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. 1994). 
 133 Id. 
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language of the statute prevented the licensing authorities from imposing 
conditions on licenses.134 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, holding 
that determining proper cause “inherently includes the power to restrict the use 
to the purposes that justified the issuance.”135 
The Second Circuit upheld this category of good cause statutes in Kachalsky 
v. County of Westchester.136 In Kachalsky, the plaintiffs applied for concealed 
carry permits, which required showing “proper cause.”137 The plaintiff-
applicants listed “self-defense” as proper cause,138 but the licensing authority 
denied the applications because the plaintiffs failed to show a “special need for 
self-protection.”139 After the denials, the plaintiffs challenged New York’s good 
cause statute under the Second Amendment.140  
The Second Circuit affirmed New York’s denial of the plaintiff’s 
applications.141 The court explained that the proper cause requirement was 
defined by state courts “to include carrying a handgun for target practice, 
hunting, or self-defense,” but that this broad definition also gave licensing 
officers discretion to restrict the concealed carry permit to limited purposes.142 
The Second Circuit applied the Marzzarella two-step analysis to this 
interpretation of the New York statute and upheld this interpretation of “good 
cause” after applying intermediate scrutiny.143 The court determined that the 
government had an important interest in public safety and crime prevention, and 
that a good cause restriction on concealed carry permits was substantially related 
to achieving that goal.144 
C. The Third Category: Restrictive Definition and Permissive Open 
Carry  
The third category of good cause statutes occurs when it is difficult to prove 
good cause for the purposes of carrying a concealed weapon, but it is not 
difficult to carry firearms openly. This category encompasses good cause 
statutes that severely restrict or prohibit carrying a concealed firearm in public 
for self-defense, but that permit openly carrying firearms in public for the same 
purpose. This particular category can only be found in Delaware.145  
                                                                                                                     
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 701 F.3d 81, 101. 
 137 Id. at 83; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2018). 
 138 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 83. 
 139 Id. at 83–84. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 101. 
 142 Id. at 86. 
 143 Id. at 96–97. 
 144 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97–101. 
 145 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1441(a)(2) (2015). 
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Delaware’s definition of good cause in its concealed carry statute is 
exceedingly restrictive. Delaware will only issue a concealed carry license if it 
is “necessary for the protection of the applicant or the applicant’s property, or 
both.”146 But Delaware also has very permissive open carry laws, permitting 
general members of the public to openly carry firearms.147 The Third Circuit 
has not addressed this category by examining Delaware’s particular good cause 
statute, but it has already upheld a more restrictive good cause statute in New 
Jersey.148  
D. The Fourth Category: Restrictive Definition and Restrictive Open 
Carry 
The final category of good cause statutes combines a restrictive definition 
of good cause with a restrictive statutory scheme regulating the open carry of 
firearms. A good cause statute fits in this fourth category when a state severely 
restricts its citizens from carrying (either open or concealed) any weapon in 
public for the purpose of general self-defense. When a state prohibits any person 
from carrying any firearm unless they prove good cause, and when that state’s 
definition of “good cause” is narrow and strict, the result becomes a de facto 
ban. Several jurisdictions have passed good cause statutes that fit in this 
category, including California,149 Maryland,150 New Jersey,151 and Washington, 
D.C.152 In each of these jurisdictions, the statutory scheme was challenged on 
Second Amendment grounds.153 These challenges have led to a split in the 
circuits in whether the most restrictive good cause statutes violate the Second 
Amendment.154 While the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have upheld them 
for different reasons, the D.C. Circuit, in a 2015 decision, struck down the 
District’s good cause statute because of its overly restrictive nature.155 The rest 
of this Part explains the differences between the various circuits in their analyses 
of the good cause statutes located in this most restrictive category. 
                                                                                                                     
 146 Id. 
 147 See GIFFORDS LAW CTR., Open Carrying in Delaware, http://lawcenter.giffords.org 
/open-carrying-in-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/3UF6-T2S5] (last updated Nov. 7, 2017). 
 148 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussed infra Part III.D.1). 
 149 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25400, 25655 (2012). 
 150 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 151 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c) (West 2018). 
 152 D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a) (2015), invalidated by Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 
F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 153 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Peruta v. Cty. of San 
Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Peruta v. California, 
137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 
734 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 154 Compare Peruta, 824 F.3d 919, with Wrenn, 864 F.3d 650 (Ninth Circuit upholding 
California’s law while the D.C. Circuit struck the District’s down). 
 155 See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 667. 
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1. Upholding Restrictive Good Cause Statutes 
Three circuits have considered highly restrictive good cause statutes and 
concluded that they do not violate the Second Amendment.156 But each of the 
courts used different analytical moves to come to that conclusion. Where one 
examined the good cause statute separately from the broader regulatory 
scheme,157 another held that prohibitions on carrying concealed firearms are 
presumptively lawful as longstanding regulations.158 The three decisions are 
considered here in further detail. 
a. The Ninth Circuit: Peruta v. County of San Diego 
In California, a member of the general public may not carry a concealed 
firearm in public unless she has a permit to do so.159 To receive a permit, an 
applicant must show that “[g]ood cause exists for issuance of a license.”160 
California leaves the determination of whether good cause exists to the county 
or the sheriff reviewing the application.161 After the application is processed, 
the licensing authority must provide the applicant with its determination of 
whether she has met the requirements and explain its reasoning if the application 
is denied.162 
Significantly, open carry is also broadly illegal in California.163 The result 
of this statutory scheme as a whole is a de facto ban against carrying firearms 
unless the carrier has a permit. Since it is exceedingly difficult to show good 
                                                                                                                     
 156 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882; Drake, 724 F.3d at 440. 
 157 See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 919–20. 
 158 See Drake, 724 F.3d at 426. 
 159 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25400, 25655 (2012) (outlawing carrying a concealed firearm 
and providing an exemption for those with a concealed carry permit). There are also 
numerous other exemptions for peace officers, carrying for sports and entertainment, and 
licensed hunters and fishers. Id. §§ 25450–25650. However, the only provision allowing the 
general public to carry a concealed weapon without a permit is an affirmative defense that 
also requires good cause. Id. § 25600 (establishing defense for a violation of § 25400 for a 
person who can prove a reasonable belief of grave danger). 
 160 Id. § 26150(a)(2) (2016). 
 161 Id. There is wide variance among California counties regarding what constitutes 
“good cause.” Compare CTY. OF TEHAMA SHERIFF, Concealed Weapons, https://tehamaso. 
org/administration/licenses-permits/concealed-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/SL9Y-FVSL] 
(“[A]ll qualified residents of Tehama County are eligible to apply for a permit to carry 
concealed weapons.”) with S.F. POLICE DEP’T, CCW Licensing Policy (Jan. 12, 2012), 
https://sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/25869-CCW 
LicensingPolicy%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD45-5AQ3] (requiring applicants to 
provide convincing evidence of five factors related to significant risk of danger). See Kevin 
Behne, Packing Heat: Judicial Review of Concealed Carry Laws Under the Second 
Amendment, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1343, 1398–99 (2016) (explaining different restrictions used 
by different counties in California). 
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cause in some counties,164 the California good cause requirement to obtain a 
permit places a high burden on an individual’s ability to bear arms in public. 
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld California’s good cause statute 
in Peruta v. County of San Diego, determining that there is no individual right 
to carry a concealed firearm in public under the Second Amendment.165 In 
Peruta, the defendant counties denied the plaintiffs concealed carry permits 
because they did not meet the good cause requirement.166 The plaintiffs sought 
concealed carry permits for general self-defense, but the two counties that 
denied the plaintiffs permits did not recognize general self-defense as a good 
cause.167  
The plaintiffs argued that California’s overall statutory scheme prohibiting 
both open and concealed carry, taken together, amounts to a total ban on 
publicly carrying firearms for self-defense, which violates the Second 
Amendment.168 But the relief that the plaintiffs requested was limited to the 
issuance of concealed carry permits.169 Because of this, the court did not address 
whether there is a Second Amendment right to carry firearms in public.170 
Instead, the court held that based on “the overwhelming consensus of historical 
sources, . . . the protection of the Second Amendment . . . simply does not 
extend to the carrying of concealed firearms in public by members of the general 
public.”171 
The majority in Peruta never explicitly refers to the two-step framework 
that the Ninth Circuit adopted from Marzzarella,172 but the Peruta opinion still 
fits squarely within the Marzzarella two-step analysis. The first step of the 
inquiry under Marzzarella is to determine whether the regulation burdens any 
rights under the Second Amendment at all.173 The court applied step one of the 
test by asking whether the right to publicly carry concealed weapons falls within 
the scope of the Second Amendment.174 The Ninth Circuit relied on a historical 
analysis of public concealed carry laws to make this determination175 and held 
that concealed carry restrictions are fully outside the Second Amendment, so 
there was no need to consider step two.176  
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The majority in Peruta carefully limited its holding to California’s 
restrictions on carrying concealed firearms.177 Indeed, the principal difference 
in the majority and dissent is which portion of California’s statute should have 
been examined. While the majority focused on the narrow good cause 
requirement itself,178 the dissent examines the California’s statutory scheme as 
a whole. Judge Callahan contended that the bans of both open and concealed 
carrying without a permit, combined with the extreme difficulty of obtaining a 
permit, violates the Second Amendment.179 The dissent does not contest the 
majority’s contention that the good cause requirement itself does not violate the 
Second Amendment. Instead, Judge Callahan examined California’s good cause 
requirement in the context of the statutory scheme taken together.180  
b. The Third Circuit: Drake v. Filko 
To carry a gun in public in New Jersey, a person must apply for and receive 
a permit which requires a “justifiable need to carry” a weapon.181 The state 
defines “justifiable need” as “the urgent necessity for self-protection, as 
evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks, which demonstrate a special 
danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than by 
issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.”182 If the issuing body refuses to grant 
the applicant a permit, the only recourse for the applicant is to “request a hearing 
in the Superior Court . . . by filing a written request for such a hearing within 30 
days of the denial.”183 
In Drake v. Filko, four New Jersey residents challenged this statutory 
scheme, claiming the good cause statute, along with the restrictive open carry 
laws, violated their Second Amendment right to carry firearms outside of the 
home for self-defense.184 The court began its analysis with the first step of the 
Marzzarella test, and concluded that the good cause statute did not burden 
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment at all.185 The court held 
that New Jersey’s good cause statute is a “longstanding” regulation on firearms, 
which makes it “presumptively lawful” under Heller.186 
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The court made it clear that normally the analysis would stop there.187 But 
as an alternative argument, the court applied the second step of the Marzzarella 
test to determine if the statute passed heightened scrutiny.188 The court applied 
intermediate scrutiny to the statute, deciding that strict scrutiny was 
inappropriate since the good cause statute did not impact the core of the Second 
Amendment.189 After balancing the government’s interest against the impact on 
the individual’s liberty interest in carrying a firearm in public, the court held 
that the good cause statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny.190 
c. The Fourth Circuit: Woollard v. Gallagher 
Maryland’s good cause statute resembles its counterparts in California and 
New Jersey. It prohibits all firearms, both open and concealed, from being 
carried in public without a permit.191 To receive a permit, an applicant must 
demonstrate “good and substantial reason.”192 To demonstrate that good and 
substantial reason, that applicant must show “that the permit is necessary as a 
reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”193 
Just like New Jersey’s statute in the Third Circuit, Maryland’s statutory 
scheme was challenged under the Second Amendment in the Fourth Circuit.194 
The plaintiffs in Woollard brought the same claim brought in Drake, arguing 
that the Second Amendment provides a right to self-defense in public and that 
Maryland’s good cause statute unjustifiably infringed on that right.195 In 
applying the two-step analysis, the Fourth Circuit declined to decide the first 
step at all. Instead, the court simply assumed that good cause statutes implicate 
the Second Amendment in some way.196 After skipping to the second step of 
the test, the court upheld Maryland’s good cause statute, applying intermediate 
scrutiny.197 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Second 
Circuit in Kachalsky.198  
2. Invalidating Restrictive Good Cause Statutes: The D.C. Circuit 
In 2017, the D.C. Circuit broke away from the Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Ninth Circuits by striking down the District’s good cause statute.199 Until 
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Wrenn, open carry in the District was prohibited.200 Additionally, concealed 
carry was only legal with a permit, which required an applicant to show “good 
reason to fear injury to his or her person.”201 When Matthew Grace and Brian 
Wrenn tried to obtain a concealed carry permit under this regime, the District 
denied their applications because they failed to show good cause.202 The two of 
them brought suit and their cases were merged in the D.C. Circuit.203 
In Wrenn, the plaintiffs made a slightly different argument than the 
challenges to good cause statutes in other circuits: they invoked the categorical 
test used in Heller.204 So the court began by explicating the Supreme Court’s 
holding that core Second Amendment rights cannot be abrogated.205 The court 
explained that a core right of the Second Amendment is self-defense by law-
abiding citizens.206 It held that a natural reading of the Second Amendment 
suggests that this core extended beyond the home.207 The court held that there 
is a core right to carry firearms in public.208  
Critically, the court in Wrenn did not use the two-step analysis begotten by 
Marzzarella, even though it is the prevailing standard in the D.C. Circuit.209 At 
issue in Wrenn was the District’s overall gun permitting statutory scheme, which 
prohibited public carry (either open or concealed) without a permit.210 Before 
even getting to the two-step analysis from Marzzarella, the court added a “step 
zero,”211 and held that the District’s statutory scheme was an impermissible ban 
on all guns outside the home, subject to categorical protection under Heller.212 
The court in Wrenn refused to use any tier of scrutiny because the District’s law 
stripped individual Second Amendment rights from too many people to be 
justified under any circumstances.213 
The split between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits can be explained almost 
entirely by the breadth of the question each court examined. Both cases involved 
similar statutory schemes, requiring a permit to carry a weapon publicly at all 
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and requiring a showing of good cause to get a permit.214 In Wrenn, the D.C. 
Circuit struck down the good cause statute because the statutory scheme taken 
as a whole was a de facto ban on carrying firearms in public at all.215 The 
question in Wrenn required an examination of the full scope of the District’s 
permitting scheme, including the good cause statute as well as the broader open 
carry ban. But in Peruta, the question the Ninth Circuit answered was whether 
there is an individual right to carry concealed weapons generally.216 The court 
in Peruta avoided striking down California’s good cause statute by narrowly 
tailoring the issue it considered on appeal.217 Indeed, it is easy to imagine the 
outcome of the case changing if the Ninth Circuit were forced to consider the 
totality of California’s gun permit statutory scheme.218 The key difference 
between Peruta and Wrenn is that where the court in Peruta avoided considering 
the overall statutory scheme,219 the court in Wrenn embraced it.220 
There is an even more apparent contradiction between Wrenn and Drake,221 
which upheld New Jersey’s extremely restrictive statutory scheme for gun 
permits as “longstanding restrictions” allowed by Heller.222 In Wrenn, the D.C. 
Circuit addressed this contradiction in piecemeal fashion, first acknowledging 
that there are “longstanding” restrictions that are presumptively lawful,223 then 
explaining why two longstanding practices restricting public-carry in densely 
populated areas do not apply.224 On appeal, the District identified two 
“longstanding” statutes from Anglo-American history to support its good cause 
statute—English Northampton laws and surety laws.225 The Northampton laws 
prevented members of the general population from carrying firearms in 
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public.226 According to surety laws, if a person “reasonably feared” harm from 
someone publicly carrying a firearm, the weapon-holder had to post bond to 
cover any damage he did with the firearm unless he could show “reason to fear 
injury.”227 
The court discounted the Northampton laws and distinguished the surety 
laws from the District’s law at issue.228 The court held that the Northampton 
laws were outdated vestiges of British law abandoned by the colonies and 
replaced by early American commentaries, which showed that the individual 
right captured by the Second Amendment was more developed than the 
traditional English right to bear arms at the time of the Northampton laws.229 
The court also distinguished traditional surety laws from the statute at issue in 
Wrenn.230 Surety laws, the court explained, began with the presumption that 
individuals have a right to publicly bear arms, and that inherent right could be 
limited by someone else’s “reasonable fear.”231 At that point, the individual 
must prove good cause to restore the inherent right.232 But the District’s good 
cause law began with the presumption that individuals may not bear arms in 
public and that they must prove good cause to restore their rights.233 
The D.C. Circuit also offered a broader critique of the other circuit 
decisions: the court suggested that the other circuits improperly “relied on an 
inference from the tolerance of American law for certain other carrying 
regulations.”234 The Second and Fourth Circuits justified good cause statutes by 
analogizing them to the longstanding restrictions contemplated in Heller.235 The 
D.C. Circuit disagreed, drawing an analogy from the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence and holding that legislatures “must leave ample 
channels for keeping and for carrying arms.”236 According to the court in 
Wrenn, the District’s good cause statute did not leave sufficient channels for 
individuals to exercise their Second Amendment rights.237 
The D.C. Circuit is the first circuit to strike down a good cause statute under 
the Second Amendment, but Wrenn is not totally incompatible with the other 
circuit decisions. The next Part proposes a way for the Supreme Court to 
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reconcile Wrenn with the rest of the circuits, solidify the analytical framework 
for the Second Amendment, and properly balance the competing interests 
inherent in firearm regulation all in one fell swoop. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD USE THE PRELIMINARY “STEP ZERO” 
TEST, AND FORMALLY ADOPT THE MARZZARELLA TWO-STEP  
The split between the D.C. Circuit and the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Ninth Circuits may come to an end in the next couple of terms. Although Wrenn 
sputtered out after the D.C. Circuit denied the District’s request for an en banc 
rehearing,238 the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to a Second 
Amendment case involving New York City’s gun licensing system from the 
Second Circuit.239 The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to address the 
Circuit split and clarify the scope of the Second Amendment, giving further 
guidance to lower courts on how to answer Second Amendment questions. This 
Part argues that the Court should give this guidance by reaffirming the “step 
zero” categorical analysis used by the D.C. Circuit in Wrenn, and then by 
formally adopting the Marzzarella two-step framework. 
A. The Court Should Adopt the Categorical “Step Zero” Used in Wrenn 
The Supreme Court should formally approve the preliminary categorical 
analysis used by the D.C. Circuit in Wrenn. Heller itself stands for the 
proposition that core rights under the Second Amendment must be categorically 
protected.240 But what is a core right? The Court has given little guidance to 
circuits on this question. In Heller, the Court did not attempt to delineate the 
entire scope of the individual rights within the Second Amendment.241 The 
Court did not seek “to clarify the entire field, any more than Reynolds v. United 
States, [its] first in-depth Free Exercise Clause case, left that area in a state of 
utter certainty.”242 Instead, its holding was limited to striking down one of the 
most restrictive gun laws in the history of the United States.243 
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The Court’s next opportunity to inform the circuits on how to approach the 
core of the Second Amendment came in McDonald v. City of Chicago.244 
McDonald included in-depth discussions about how the Court has determined 
what rights are protected from state interference through the doctrine of 
substantive due process and incorporation.245 The Court explained that circuits 
should incorporate rights if they are “immutable principles of justice which 
inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may 
disregard,”246 if they are “are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental,”247 or if they “are the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty and essential to a fair and enlightened system of 
justice.”248  
Although McDonald addresses incorporation, the incorporation tests 
articulated by the Court are useful analytical tools for circuits to use in 
determining whether something is a “core” right. Categorical protection should 
not be given lightly; such steadfast protection should only be given to core 
constitutional rights. The categorical right in Heller is lawful self-defense in the 
home.249 To determine how much further the scope of categorical protection 
should extend, there is a certain intuitive logic to using the Court’s incorporation 
tests to determine which rights are protected by the Second Amendment “above 
all other interests.”250 Both should require a higher standard to match the greater 
protections they afford. 
The Ninth Circuit engaged in a similar historical analysis for an alleged right 
to carry concealed weapons in Peruta v. County of San Diego.251 The court in 
Peruta recognized that Heller and McDonald mandate an inquiry into whether 
an alleged right is deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of the American 
people.252 Even though the analysis looked like an application of the first step 
of Marzzarella,253 the court’s discussion was focused instead on the history of 
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concealed carry regulations in the United States.254 After an in-depth historical 
analysis, the majority concluded that there is no core right to concealed carry 
weapons that is deeply rooted in history.255 
The D.C. Circuit applied the same kind of historical analysis in Wrenn v. 
District of Columbia.256 In previous cases, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Heller 
to mean that a restriction imposing substantially on a core right of the Second 
Amendment requires strict scrutiny, rather than categorical protection.257 In 
Wrenn, however, the court held that carrying a firearm for lawful self-protection 
is a core right of the Second Amendment that extends beyond the home.258 It 
went on to strike down the District’s statutory scheme as an impermissible ban 
on publicly carrying firearms for lawful self-defense, holding that it did not to 
apply any level of scrutiny.259 The key point here is that the court in Wrenn 
made this analytical move before it even began the two-step test. Instead, it 
began with an initial “step zero” categorical test, concluding that a law that 
flunks this test will always be unconstitutional.260 
Wrenn’s step zero adjustment to the traditional two-step framework should 
be adopted by the Supreme Court. It is more consistent with Heller because it 
addresses the categorical approach in Heller directly. The court in Wrenn stated 
that the “categorical approach is appropriate here even though our previous 
cases have always applied tiers of scrutiny to gun laws” because the two-step 
analysis has always lead to “only intermediate or strict scrutiny to every 
burdensome gun law we ever review.”261 Under the step zero approach, before 
a court can get to the Marzzarella two-step, it must first ask whether a case 
warrants categorical protection of a core Second Amendment right.262 If it does 
(i.e., if it infringes on a core right of the Second Amendment), the court must 
strike down the offending law. If not, the court must proceed to the first step of 
the Marzzarella test.263 
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B. The Court Should Adopt the Marzzarella Two-Step 
After the Supreme Court solidifies a preliminary categorical analysis of 
Second Amendment questions with a step zero baseline, the Court should fully 
adopt the two-step framework first used in Marzzarella.264 The Court in Heller 
explicitly left much of the Second Amendment to the lower courts, and nearly 
all of the circuits have agreed that the two-step test is the appropriate analytical 
framework.265 These courts adopted the Marzzarella two-step in part because it 
comes from a First Amendment analysis, and the Supreme Court in Heller and 
McDonald frequently used the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as a 
guide for its Second Amendment cases.266 Second Amendment cases are rife 
with comparisons between the First and Second Amendments. And the two-step 
analysis—for both the First and Second Amendment—strikes an appropriate 
balance between the constitutional protection of an individual liberty and the 
government’s interest in promoting safety and the general welfare.  
In Heller, the Supreme Court suggested that lower courts should be 
responsible for further analysis of the Second Amendment.267 The court 
declined to “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of 
the Second Amendment,”268 and instead punted such analyses to the lower 
courts.269 Over the next decade, nearly every single circuit formally adopted the 
same two-step analytical framework to answer Second Amendment 
questions.270 This kind of overwhelming uniformity of approval and adoption 
among the circuits should persuade the Supreme Court that the test itself is 
analytically sound. 
The circuits have all agreed on the two-step test in part because of its roots 
in First Amendment jurisprudence.271 The Marzzarella two-step test comes 
from a First Amendment case, United States v. Stevens,272 where the court used 
a similar two-step analysis. The first step is to determine if a statute implicates 
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the First Amendment at all.273 If it does, the court takes the second step: it 
applies the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine the statute’s 
constitutionality.274 In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit took the Stevens test step 
by step, simply replacing the First Amendment with the Second.275 Taken 
together, the connection between the First and Second Amendment, approved 
by the Supreme Court and developed by the circuits, leads to the clear 
conclusion that the Court should adopt the Marzzarella two-step. 
The Third Circuit’s comparison to a First Amendment case was not an 
accident.276 Second Amendment cases—including Heller and McDonald—are 
rife with comparisons to the Court’s First Amendment decisions.277 In the three 
opinions of Heller, the Justices invoked the First Amendment sixteen times, 
either as an analogy to the Second Amendment, as a citation to support an 
analogous proposition, or as a response to another part of the decision making a 
similar analogy.278 Justice Scalia used the First Amendment to support the 
notion that the Second Amendment is an individual right,279 and that the Second 
Amendment applies to modern weapons;280 he even notes that other historical 
scholars have made the same comparison.281 The Heller and McDonald 
decisions show that there can be little doubt of the strong theoretical connection 
between the First and Second Amendments.  
Legal scholars also widely approve of favorably comparing the First 
Amendment to the Second. Professor David B. Kopel lauds the common history 
and purpose of the two amendments, arguing that both were ratified to protect 
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individual rights from government interference.282 He goes on to identify certain 
topics in First Amendment jurisprudence that can naturally be read into the 
Second Amendment.283 From the rights surviving changes to technology284 to 
concepts like chilling and vagueness,285 Professor Kopel demonstrates why the 
First and Second Amendment share so much common ground. And he is not 
alone in his analysis.286 
Finally, the Court should adopt the two-step test because comparing the 
First and Second Amendment makes intuitive sense. The Constitution 
recognizes the need to balance the right to bear arms with the government’s 
interest in promoting the general welfare in society. The Court has recognized 
in First Amendment cases that a government can prohibit entire categories of 
speech to promote society’s interest in protecting “social interest in order and 
morality.”287 And the majority in Heller recognized that there are limitations to 
the Second Amendment too.288 The two-step test is an excellent way for courts 
to determine these limitations because it balances the protection of individual 
liberties with the promotion of a safer society. Of course, the two-step test 
should be modified to include a preliminary step zero.289 But because of 
Marzzarella’s logical outgrowth from the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
should formally adopt it as the analytical framework for Second Amendment 
questions.  
V. APPLYING THE NEW TEST TO EACH CATEGORY OF GOOD CAUSE 
STATUTES 
Using the new Second Amendment framework proposed here, the question 
of the constitutionality of good cause statutes begins with step zero: whether a 
good cause statute infringes on a core right of the Second Amendment. If it does, 
it is invalid according to the categorical test under Heller and step zero of the 
analysis; if it does not, proceed to the Marzzarella two-step test. This Part 
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examines the categories of good cause statutes under the proposed framework, 
determining that only the most restrictive good cause statutes categorically 
infringe on the core right to self-defense, failing step zero. It then applies the 
next part of the two-step analysis to the remaining categories of good cause 
statutes, concluding that while good cause statutes can exist in harmony with 
the Second Amendment, they can also go too far. 
A. Step Zero: When a Restrictive Definition Meets a Restrictive Open 
Carry Regime, the Statutory Scheme Violates the Second Amendment 
Although there is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding the scope of core 
rights,290 courts have struck down regulations as categorical violations of the 
Second Amendment when they are explicit or de facto bans.291 But good cause 
statutes are not always so restrictive. Instead, the different categories of good 
cause statutes implicate different possible Second Amendment rights: the right 
to carry in public generally, the right to open carry in public, and the right to 
concealed carry in public.292 Applying step zero to each of these possible rights 
shows that only the most restrictive good cause statutes banning public carry of 
firearms altogether will categorically fail step zero under the modified Second 
Amendment analysis proposed here. 
To determine if the most restrictive good cause statutes fail step zero, the 
relevant question is whether there is a core right within the Second Amendment 
to carry firearms in public.293 This is a close question. In Heller, the Supreme 
Court noted in its historical analysis that the Second Amendment was 
“understood to be an individual right protecting against both public and private 
violence.”294 Despite this suggestive language, there is a wide split on the issue 
among the circuits, ranging from a definitive right, to a limited right, to no right 
at all.295  
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The Seventh Circuit held the right to publicly carry firearms is logical 
because “the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home.”296 
The D.C. Circuit held in Wrenn that an individual right to carry for self-defense 
in public was based in history.297 The court held that the nineteenth century 
cases cited in Heller applied to self-defense both within the home, and in 
public.298  
The Ninth Circuit most recently solidified the right to public carry in Young 
v. Hawaii.299 The plaintiff in Young applied for a license to carry his firearm 
openly in public, and challenged Hawaii’s restrictive firearm licensing statutory 
scheme after he was rejected.300 The Ninth Circuit held that there is a core 
Second Amendment right to openly carry firearms in public.301 The court first 
distinguished Young from Peruta, noting that Peruta was limited to concealed-
carry restrictions, and that it “explicitly left unresolved the question of whether 
the Second Amendment encompasses a right to open carry.”302 Next, the court 
in Young explored what a “core” Second Amendment right entails.303 The court 
focused its inquiry on “whether the core of the right encompasses 
both . . . keeping and bearing arms for self-defense, or, more narrowly, only 
keeping arms for self-defense within the home.”304 The court decided on the 
former and held that Hawaii’s statutory scheme violated the Second 
Amendment because the “typical, law-abiding citizen in the State of Hawaii 
is . . . entirely foreclosed from exercising the core Second Amendment right to 
bear arms for self-defense.”305  
The battle over Hawaii’s statutory scheme in the Ninth Circuit is far from 
over. In some ways, Young bears a striking resemblance to Peruta. The Ninth 
Circuit panel in Young was split, just like Peruta. As fate would have it, Judge 
O’Scannlain wrote the majority opinion in Young, just as he did in Peruta.306 
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And the Ninth Circuit granted an en banc rehearing in Young,307 just as it did in 
Peruta.308  
Hawaii has a good shot at winning a reversal at an en banc rehearing. Judge 
Clifton—dissenting in Young—noted that seven out of the eleven judges in 
Peruta believed that the similarly restrictive statutory scheme in California 
“struck ‘a permissible balance between granting handgun permits to those 
persons known to be in need of self-protection and precluding a dangerous 
proliferation of handguns on the streets.’”309 A Ninth Circuit panel sitting en 
banc in Young will most likely make good on the dicta in Peruta and hold that 
there is not a core right to publicly carry firearms. For now, though, the Ninth 
Circuit is the third appellate court to hold that there is a core constitutional right 
to carry firearms in public.310 
In the middle of the road sit the First and Second Circuits, both of which 
have tacitly accepted the right to bear arms in public without affirmatively 
holding that the right exists.311 The Fourth Circuit in Drake expressed some 
doubt that the Second Amendment extends beyond the home, but it did so 
cautiously in dicta.312  
For everyone keeping score at home, that brings the current tally of circuit 
courts to three circuits carving a definitive core Second Amendment right to 
carry publicly, two circuits declining to define the scope of the right, and one 
expressing doubt to any right to carry publicly at all. The definitive rulings in 
the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, along with the waffling in the other 
circuits leads to the conclusion that there is some core right under the Second 
Amendment to carry in public.313 Thus, whether a good cause statute fails step 
zero of this new framework depends on the breadth and severity of its restriction. 
If there are tight restrictions on who may open carry in a jurisdiction, there 
cannot also be an impossibly high standard an applicant must show to 
demonstrate good cause.314 Therefore, a statute that combines a restrictive 
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definition of good cause with a restrictive open carry policy must be struck down 
at step zero as an impermissible de facto ban on firearms in public altogether.315 
This is the trouble that Washington, D.C. ran into in Wrenn,316 and it is the 
same trouble that other states in the most restrictive category of good cause 
statutes will run into if this approach is adopted by the Supreme Court. The good 
cause statutes in California, Hawaii, Maryland, and New Jersey all use 
restrictive language defining what constitutes “good cause.”317 They also all 
have highly restrictive statutory schemes regarding carrying firearms openly.318 
These two factors together infringe on an individual’s Second Amendment right 
to carry a firearm. But the statutory solution is just as simple: If these states 
loosen the restrictions on either one of these factors, the result would be a 
statutory scheme that permissibly restricts firearm use without amounting to an 
outright ban on publicly carrying firearms. 
Several other good cause statutes run into the same trouble when state courts 
interpret less restrictive language in good cause statutes to be more restrictive.319 
When this restrictive interpretation of the definition of good cause combines 
with a general ban on openly carrying firearms, the result becomes a de facto 
ban, which flunks step zero.  
New York serves as perfect examples of this idea. The interpretation of New 
York’s good cause statute in O’Connor v. Scarpino gives power to local police 
departments to restrict gun permits to hunting or sport.320 At the same time, the 
statutory scheme overall prevents carrying any weapon without a permit.321 
Since a permit for self-defense is difficult to come by, the New York statutes as 
interpreted in O’Connor cannot be sustained.  
To side-step this trouble, courts in states like New York should prevent a de 
facto ban through the constitutional avoidance doctrine.322 When faced with a 
similar statute, a court has two reasonable readings: one gives the local licensing 
authority the power to unconstitutionally limit the purpose of the licenses issued; 
the other gives the permissive language of the statute its full effect. When faced 
with this question, courts must choose the latter and truly include any 
permissible reason within the definition of good cause.323  
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Thus interpreted, the other categories of good cause statutes have little 
difficulty in passing step zero of the proposed framework. When open carry is 
broadly legal, requiring an applicant to show good cause before she can be 
issued a concealed carry permit does not amount to a total ban on carrying 
weapons in public for lawful self-defense. This is true no matter how difficult it 
is for an applicant to show good cause. Since carrying concealed firearms in 
public is not a core right of the Second Amendment,324 there is no step zero 
problem with this category.  
Similarly, an easy-to-meet good cause requirement does not amount to a de 
facto ban on firearms, regardless of whether open carry is legal or not. As long 
as some avenue to publicly carry exists, there is no unlimited right to open 
carry.325 Instead, circuit courts that have held there is a public right to carry have 
borrowed the “alternative channels” doctrine from the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.326 In short, the alternative channels doctrine gives legislatures 
the constitutional authority to choose which method of carrying in public may 
be prohibited: a state may ban either open carry or concealed carry, but not 
both.327 
At least one commentator has suggested that the traditional historical 
analysis mandated by Heller leads to the conclusion that open carry, and only 
open carry, is a guaranteed right under the Second Amendment outside the 
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home.328 This conclusion is based on a rigorous examination of antebellum 
cases that routinely protected individuals’ right to open carry and routinely 
upheld restrictions on concealed carry.329 It is also predicated on the assumption 
that all Second Amendment cases must begin and end with an originalist 
interpretation, and that there is no room for further analysis.330 But this second 
assumption unravels in the face of analytical development of Second 
Amendment cases in the circuit courts, as well as the fact that even Heller has 
notes of nonoriginalism.331 The framework proposed in this Note—even the 
categorical step zero introduced in Wrenn—is not compatible with only an 
originalist viewing of the Second Amendment. It is more complete than that. 
The proposed framework here requires courts to undertake a thorough 
investigation of Second Amendment questions, beginning with originalism to 
locate the core of the amendment and ending with a familiar means-end scrutiny 
test to determine peripheral rights. 
Lastly, as a practical matter, the alternative channels doctrine is much more 
politically appealing than an open carry system for advocates on both sides of 
the debate.332 For gun control advocates, a rigid open carry system “combines 
the danger of guns with the public terror of observing them regularly.”333 For 
gun rights advocates, such a system ignores the fact that openly carrying “is 
outside of mainstream practice and inspires discomfort and sometimes panic or 
terror.”334 The alternative channels doctrine also allows for more flexibility 
among the states to choose their own path for regulation. Rather than forcing 
every state to allow open carry, the alternative channels doctrine opens the 
laboratories of democracy and gives states the leeway to take a one-or-the-other 
approach to regulation. 
B. The Two-Step: Other Categories of Good Cause Statutes Do Not 
Violate the Second Amendment as Long as They Survive Intermediate 
Scrutiny 
Even after Wrenn, there is a place for statutes that require a showing of good 
cause to receive a concealed carry license. Good cause statutes are regulations 
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limiting the right to carry a concealed weapon.335 States are well within their 
rights to enact regulations on carrying concealed weapons.336 And Wrenn did 
not change this.337 The court in Wrenn was careful to limit its holding to the 
conclusion that the core of the Second Amendment is still lawful self-defense 
and only went on to hold that the core right to lawful self-defense extends 
beyond the home.338 Under Wrenn, the District is not barred from regulating 
concealed carry permits. The important reminder in Wrenn is that these good 
cause regulations should not amount to a total ban on publicly carrying weapons 
in lawful self-defense.339 
Thus, Wrenn does not stand for the proposition that there is a per se 
constitutional right to carry concealed weapons, nor that every good cause 
statute is an unconstitutional ban. Wrenn’s holding is rather limited: the court 
held that the District’s particular flavor of good cause statute was tantamount to 
total bans on guns in public, which made it invalid under the Second 
Amendment’s core right to lawful self-defense in public.340  
Even after Wrenn, good cause statutes flourish in many different forms 
across many different jurisdictions.341 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit is the only circuit 
court to strike down a good cause statute. There is little doubt that at least some 
forms of good cause statutes do not completely prevent citizens from publicly 
carrying guns. These forms of good cause statutes then are not categorically 
barred by Heller and step zero. Once a good cause statute passes step zero, it 
must then be considered under the Marzzarella two-step test. 
After determining that a law does not impermissibly infringe on a core right 
of the Second Amendment, step one of the test is to determine if the law raises 
the specter of the Second Amendment at all.342 If a court determines that a 
Second Amendment right has been implicated in some form, the next question 
is step two: courts must ask what level of scrutiny should apply and then apply 
that level of scrutiny.343 
The Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits all assumed arguendo that there is 
some form of individual right to bear arms outside the home under the Second 
Amendment.344 All three have also ruled that intermediate scrutiny is the proper 
form of heightened scrutiny for examining good cause statutes.345 Once 
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applying intermediate scrutiny, each of the circuits upheld the good cause 
statutes as constitutionally valid.346 
The difference between the remaining circuits comes in step one of the 
framework. In Drake v. Filko, the Fourth Circuit held that New Jersey’s good 
cause statute was a presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation, and therefore 
did not implicate the Second Amendment at all.347 The other two circuits, 
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester and Woollard v. Gallagher, simply assumed 
the first step was met and focused their analyses on the second step.348  
As with step zero of the analysis, the application of the first step of the 
inquiry to good cause statutes should examine the breadth and the extent of the 
restrictions in the language of the statute. A good cause statute that restricts all 
forms of carry seems to implicate individual rights under the Second 
Amendment, even where showing good cause is relatively easy.349 This 
category of good cause statutes tends to fail step one—that is, at the very least, 
these statutes implicate the Second Amendment—but depending on how strict 
the permitting scheme is, statutes within this category can still pass step two by 
surviving intermediate scrutiny.  
Intermediate scrutiny is an interest balancing test that requires a 
“significant, substantial, or important” government interest that does not 
“burden more conduct than is necessary.”350 Therefore, strict regulatory 
permitting schemes will fail intermediate scrutiny if there is not a substantial 
government interest, or if the statute is so strict as to burden individuals’ right 
to self-defense more than necessary. Intuitively, this suggests that there is some 
point at which a state’s permitting scheme fails step two because it is too strict 
to fit the government’s interest in preventing gun violence from concealed carry 
holders, but that line remains to be drawn. Instead, the spirit of step two is easier 
to state through its general principle: the easier it is to acquire a permit, the less 
restrictive it is, and the more likely it is to pass intermediate scrutiny.  
Conversely, a good cause statute that restricts only concealed carry permits, 
and allows an individual to open carry,351 is merely a regulation on concealed 
carry weapons, which does not implicate the Second Amendment at all.352 So 
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in one way, the question of whether a good cause statute can survive Second 
Amendment scrutiny can boil down to how a state sells its firearm regulation 
package. The more it focuses on only regulating concealed weapons, the less it 
is likely to implicate the guarantees of the Second Amendment. But the more a 
statute heralds itself as an overall gun regulation package, the more the danger 
grows that it will unacceptably infringe on individuals’ Second Amendment 
liberty.  
For good cause statutes that do implicate the Second Amendment, the next 
question is what level of heightened scrutiny should apply.353 Case law and 
common sense agree that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of 
analysis for good cause statutes.354 The proposition that good cause statutes 
regulating concealed weapons in public are subject to intermediate scrutiny still 
carries support from the majority of circuits that have considered the issue, and 
circuit courts have applied intermediate scrutiny to a multitude of regulations of 
other Second Amendment issues.355 
Intermediate scrutiny also balances best the rights of individuals to keep and 
bear arms with important government goals of reducing and preventing gun 
violence. Good cause requirements for concealed carry weapons may prove to 
be important in cities where gun violence is more prevalent.356 Intermediate 
scrutiny allows courts to take into account differences like population density 
that bright-line rules cannot address. A good cause statute may pass 
constitutional muster for a city ordinance in New Orleans, whereas the same 
statute from a state legislature in Wyoming may fail intermediate scrutiny.357 
The framework that this Note proposes also balances the principles of individual 
rights and federalism. The two-step test provides states with latitude to tailor 
their own policies to their own specific needs. It gives states greater self-
determination. But at the same time, the framework is ultimately a check on 
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states who may abuse this authority in an overzealous attempt to curb gun 
violence. 
Under the framework proposed by this Note, good cause statutes should be 
limited in two ways. First, the statutes cannot amount to a de facto ban on 
carrying firearms for self-defense in public. And second, such statutes must be 
narrowly tailored to fit a significant government interest, consistent with 
intermediate scrutiny. Since most good cause statutes are passed with concrete 
goals of reducing firearm casualties and promoting public health and safety, the 
main hurdle for these statutes is limiting the language to make them sufficiently 
narrow to fit the needs of the jurisdiction and prevent them from banning 
weapons in public completely.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should adopt the categorical step zero introduced in 
Wrenn for Second Amendment questions.358 The Court should also formally 
adopt the two-step framework used in Marzzarella as a baseline for analyzing 
Second Amendment questions.359 When this modified two-step is firmly in 
place, lower courts will have a definitive mode of analysis, and they will be able 
to better balance the competing interests of public safety and health and the 
individual’s right to self-defense.  
For states, the best way to implement good cause statutes is to draft them in 
conjunction with the overall statutory scheme. States must find the right balance 
between how restrictive their definition of good cause is and how restrictive 
their overall statutory system regulating firearms is. To make sure that the 
balance legislatures strike does not overstep their constitutional limits, courts 
should apply the two-step framework, beginning with the categorical step zero. 
Building a solid analytical framework for answering Second Amendment 
questions is only the first step to providing local, state, and federal legislatures 
with the tools they need to harmonize an individual’s right to bear arms in self-
defense with the government’s pressing need to reduce gun violence across the 
nation. While good cause statutes are a good example of how the two-step test 
can work, the framework this Note proposes is even more versatile.  
For example, the Court recently granted certiorari in New York State Rifle 
& Pistol Association v. City of New York.360 The plaintiffs challenge a different 
aspect of New York’s statutory licensing scheme. Instead of homing in on the 
good cause requirement under § 400.00(2)(f) specifically,361 the plaintiffs focus 
on a New York City code that prohibits transportation of a firearm outside city 
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limits.362 The plaintiffs argue that by forbidding citizens to leave the City with 
their weapons, the Cityinfringes on their core Second Amendment right to 
“acquire and maintain proficiency in [the use of firearms].”363 
The Second Circuit applied the two-step test developed from Marzarrella, 
and assumed without deciding that the City’s rule restricted some activity 
protected by the Second Amendment.364 The court rejected strict scrutiny and 
chose to apply intermediate scrutiny “[b]ecause [it assumed], arguendo, that the 
Rule approaches the Second Amendment’s core area of protection . . . though it 
does not impose a substantial burden [on it].”365 The court devoted significant 
attention to the scope of the core right to self-defense in the home, but only in 
the context of determining whether strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny 
applied.366 The Second Circuit never considered whether the rights articulated 
by the plaintiffs should receive the categorical protection that comes directly 
from Heller. 
The Supreme Court should review the Second Circuit’s decision under the 
framework proposed by this Note. Begin the analysis with the categorical 
analysis, determining whether New York City’s regulation hits on a core 
guarantee of the Second Amendment. Doing so emphasizes the lesson from 
Heller that certain rights cannot be limited “[u]nder any standards of 
scrutiny.”367 This requires the Court to ask whether publicly transporting 
firearms hits the very core of the amendment’s protections. If it does, the statute 
cannot be validated. The Court should only proceed to reviewing the Second 
Circuit’s application of the two step test if it determines that the regulation does 
not fail at step zero.  
The Marzzarella two-step, supplemented by Wrenn’s categorical step zero, 
can also be applied to any other firearm regulation, from bump-stock bans to 
bullet control.368 As legislatures grapple with how best to tackle the tragedy of 
gun violence without treading on civil liberties, an authoritative decision from 
the Supreme Court on the Second Amendment will go a long way to giving 
guidance on the correct way to approach the balancing act. 
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